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Abstract
Growth models of the Dutch disease, such as those of Krugman
(1987), Matsuyama (1992), Sachs and Warner (1995) and Gylfason
et al. (1999), explain why resource abundance may reduce growth.
However, the literature also raises a new question: if the use of re-
source wealth hurts productivity growth, how should such wealth be
optimally managed? This question forms the topic of the present pa-
per, in which we extend the growth literature on the Dutch disease
from a positive to a normative setting. We show that the assumptions
in the previous literature imply that the optimal share of national
wealth consumed in each period needs to be adjusted down. However,
some Dutch disease is always optimal. Thus lower growth in resource
abundant countries may not be a problem in itself, but may be part of
an optimal growth path. The optimal spending path of the resource
wealth may be increasing or decreasing over time, and we discuss why
this is the case.
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1 Introduction
There is now a large body of literature claiming that resource abundance
lowers growth. Such findings in the case studies by Gelb (1988) have later
been confirmed in other case studies by Karl (1997) and Auty (1999, 2001)
as well as in econometric studies by Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997, 2001),
Gylfason et al. (1999) and Busby et al. (2002).1 The most widespread
theoretical explanation of this apparent puzzle is found in models of the
Dutch disease2, where resource abundance shifts factors of production away
from sectors generating learning by doing (LBD).3 Studies by vanWijnbergen
(1984), Krugman (1987), Matsuyama (1992), Sachs and Warner (1995) and
Gylfason et al. (1999) all find that when the exploitation of more natural
resources shrinks the traded (or industrial) sector, LBD and thus productivity
growth is reduced. This literature has been most influential in explaining why
resource wealth may lower growth. However, little attention has been given
to the question of how resource wealth should be managed given that the use
of such wealth lowers productivity growth. This is the topic of the present
paper.
The seminal contribution on the Dutch disease with endogenous produc-
tivity is the two period model by vanWijnbergen (1984), where second period
productivity in the traded sector depends on first period production of traded
goods. Although van Wijnbergen does not directly discuss how the resource
wealth should be optimally managed, the paper includes normative analysis
on the design of subsidies. However, the later growth literature on the topic
has neglected the normative aspects. Krugman (1987), Sachs and Warner
(1995), Gylfason et al. (1999) and Torvik (2001) consider an exogenous flow
1For a paper that questions the empirical connection between resource abundance and
growth, see Stijns (2002).
2Normally the term ’Dutch disease’ refers to adverse eﬀects on the traded sector when
resource income pushes domestic demand up. The term has also been used to refer to the
possible negative growth eﬀects following the reallocation of production factors. However,
as we will show, even in the case where growth decreases, this may be the optimal response
to resource abundance. Despite this, we choose to use the term ’disease’ as this is firmly
established among economists.
3Other explanations include theories of rent-seeking (Lane and Tornell, 1996; Tornell
and Lane, 1999; Baland and Francois, 2000; Torvik, 2002; Mehlum et al., 2002) and
political economy theories of why resource abundance invites bad policy choices (Ross,
1999, 2001; Robinson et al., 2002).
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of resource income in each period and trace out the growth eﬀects.4 The
present paper extends this growth literature from a positive to a normative
setting. To do so we simply adopt the same assumptions regarding produc-
tivity growth as the earlier literature and then derive the implications for
optimal consumption, management of resource wealth, and growth.
Given the influential contributions on the linkage between LBD and the
Dutch disease, the implications of this literature for the optimal management
of resource wealth should clearly be of some interest. We show that the LBD
mechanism in the earlier literature implies that the optimal share of national
wealth consumed in each period needs to be adjusted down. However, a
positive fraction of the resource wealth should be consumed in each period
— some Dutch disease is always optimal. Thus, lower growth in resource
abundant countries may not be a problem in itself, but may be part of an
optimal growth path. When the market interest rate equals the social rate of
time preference, open economymodels with zero or exogenous growth imply a
flat optimal consumption path. However, the optimal solution of the present
model in this case implies a rising consumption path. The optimal Dutch
disease is thus suﬃciently weak for each generation to consume more than
the preceding generation. The spending path of the resource wealth may be
increasing or decreasing over time. A positive growth potential with LBD
pulls in the direction of large transfers to early generations, while a negative
eﬀect on productivity growth from using the resource wealth pulls in the
other direction. The higher the share of non-traded goods in consumption,
the weaker is the first eﬀect and the stronger is the second. Thus, the more
important that non-traded goods are as a proportion of consumption, and
the less important traded goods are, the more likely it is that the optimal
spending path of the resource wealth is increasing over time.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented
in Section 2. Section 3 derives optimal consumption, while the implications
for optimal current account and output growth are discussed in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
4The resource abundance eﬀect in each period is also exogenous in Matsuyama (1992),
represented by the productivity of land.
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2 The model
Following other models of the Dutch disease, we consider a small open econ-
omy that produces traded (T) and non-traded (N ) goods. The single most
important assumption in the models concerns what factor drives productiv-
ity growth. With the exception of Torvik (2001), the literature assumes that
productivity growth is generated through LBD in the traded sector only. Van
Wijnbergen (1984), Krugman (1987), Matsuyama (1992) and Gylfason et al.
(1999) assume that LBD only benefits the sector where it is generated, while
productivity in the rest of the economy is constant. Thus, these studies in-
volve models of unbalanced growth. Sachs and Warner (1995), on the other
hand, have balanced growth, as they assume that the learning benefits the
traded and non-traded sector in the same way.5 Here we adopt the same
LBD mechanism as Sachs and Warner (1995).6 Denoting the (fraction of
the total) labor force employed in the traded sector in period t by ηt, the
dynamics of productivity H are:
Ht+1 −Ht
Ht
= αηt, (1)
where the parameter α ≥ 0 measures the strength of the LBD eﬀect. As
in the earlier literature, the LBD eﬀect is external to firms, the underlying
assumption being that each firm is too small to take its own contribution to
LBD into account.
Normalizing the size of the labor force to unity, the production functions
in the two sectors are given by:
XNt = Ht(1− ηt) (2)
XTt = Htηt (3)
where XNt and XTt denote production of non-traded and traded goods, re-
spectively. As the model at each point in time has constant returns to scale,
5A discussion of the Dutch disease literature can be found in Torvik (2001), who devel-
ops a more general model of learning by doing, and derives conditions for when resource
abundance does or does not reduce growth.
6We chose the specification in Sachs and Warner (1995) because, in addition to its
influence on the recent literature on the topic, the unbalanced growth mechanisms in the
other papers contain predictions that might seem problematic. For instance, although it is
not discussed by the author, the model in Krugman (1987) implies that the real exchange
rate approaches infinity.
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the real exchange rate (i.e. the relative price of non-tradables in terms of
tradables) is uniquely determined by the supply side, as in Corden and Neary
(1982, Section IV), for example. The equal productivity in (2) and (3) im-
plies that the real exchange rate is simply equal to 1. By (2) and (3) total
production (GDP) in period t is:
Xt = XNt +XTt = Ht (4)
Consumers live for one period (which we think of as a generation). There
is a representative individual in each generation. This consumer’s labor sup-
ply is fixed, he or she has no bequest motive, and allocates spending on
non-traded and traded goods according to a Cobb-Douglas felicity function.
Let γ ∈ (0, 1) be the weight on traded goods in the felicity function. The
demand for non-traded goods is thus:
CNt = (1− γ)Yt = XNt, (5)
where Yt is disposable income for generation t and the last equality shows
that in equilibrium domestic demand of non-traded goods must be matched
by domestic production of such goods.
Notice that in the absence of a public sector (and thus intergenerational
transfers) as well as of a foreign exchange gift we have Yt = Ht, since the
relative price of the two goods is one. As there is no private saving, the
demand for traded goods is CTt = γYt. It then follows from (2) and (5) that
ηt = γ, implying that the output growth rate is αγ in this case.
2.1 The social planner’s problem
The social planner’s horizon is M periods, where M > 1. Thus there are
two ineﬃciencies in the model: the representative individuals have too short
planning horizons and they ignore LBD in their allocation decisions. Poten-
tially, therefore, there is a role for the government in the model, even in the
absence of resource wealth. In general, however, we assume that the country
receives resource wealth in the form of a foreign exchange gift W1 at the be-
ginning of period 1. The planner then decides (in period 1) how to allocate
this gift over time, and we let Rt be net lump-sum transfers to generation t.
The objective is to maximize:
U =
MX
t=1
µ
1
1 + δ
¶t−1
[γ logCTt + (1− γ) logCNt] ,
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where δ is the social rate of time preference. This formulation implies that
the planner’s elasticity of intertemporal substitution is constant and equal
to one.
It turns out be convenient to rewrite the objective function in terms of
aggregate consumption. From the static demand functions and the fact that
disposable income with transfers is Yt = Ht +Rt, aggregate consumption in
period t is:
Ct = CTt + CNt = γYt + (1− γ)Yt = Rt +Ht.
Again using the static demand functions, we now have:
γ logCTt + (1− γ) logCNt = logCt + γ log γ + (1− γ) log(1− γ).
Ignoring the constant terms, the social welfare function can thus be written
as:
U =
MX
t=1
µ
1
1 + δ
¶t−1
logCt, (6)
It is important to keep in mind that Ct = Rt + Ht, since R is the policy
instrument in the model.
In choosing the optimal path for Rt, the planner takes into account the
fact that spending the gift in period t aﬀects future productivity. Using (2)
and (5), we find that traded sector employment is given by:
ηt = γ − (1− γ)
Rt
Ht
. (7)
(7) shows the static eﬀect that is often termed the Dutch disease. Trans-
ferring resource income R to generation t increases demand for traded and
non-traded goods. As increased demand for non-traded goods must be met
by domestic production, resources are drawn out of the traded sector and
into the non-traded sector. The eﬀect is stronger the more important non-
tradables are in consumption, and the larger transfers are relative to pro-
duction. Corden and Neary (1982), Corden (1984), Neary and Purvis (1983)
and Neary and van Wijnbergen (1986) provide detailed discussions of this
and other eﬀects of resource income in models without productivity growth.
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Remark 1 Since ηt ∈ (0, 1), equation (7) gives the following restrictions
on the ratio of transfers to GDP:
−1 < Rt
Ht
<
γ
1− γ , ∀t.
The first inequality simply states that negative transfers (i.e. taxes) can-
not be higher than 100 % of GDP, while the second inequality says that the
transfer-GDP ratio must be lower than the ratio of tradables to non-tradables
in aggregate consumption. All the solutions presented below are assumed to
obey these restrictions.
Substituting (7) into (1), we find that productivity (and GDP) in period
t+ 1 is:
Ht+1 = Ht(1 + αγ)− α(1− γ)Rt. (8)
(8) shows the dynamic eﬀect often associated with the Dutch disease. As
in van Wijnbergen (1984), Krugman (1987), Sachs and Warner (1995) and
Gylfason et al. (1999) generation t’s spending of the foreign exchange gift
R has a negative eﬀect on future productivity because employment in the
traded sector, and thus productivity growth, is reduced. The eﬀect is stronger
the stronger is the LBD eﬀect and the more important are non-tradables in
aggregate consumption. The reason for the latter is that a large proportion
of non-tradables in consumption greatly reduces traded sector employment
when demand increases.
So far our model has added nothing important to the earlier endogenous
growth models of the Dutch disease. As in the models of Krugman (1987),
Sachs and Warner (1995), Gylfason et al. (1999) and Torvik (2001), we have
simply shown that when assuming that LBD is generated in the traded sec-
tor, the use of resource income lowers growth. However, in the remainder of
the paper, we depart from the earlier growth models. While these models
assume exogenous resource income at each point in time as well as an ex-
ogenous current account, our aim is to find the optimal intertemporal use
of resource income and the implied optimal current account and growth dy-
namics. We thus extend the endogenous growth models of the Dutch disease
from a positive to a normative setting.
To derive the intertemporal budget constraint, we make use of the econ-
omy’s current account. Assuming that the foreign exchange gift is the only
initial foreign asset and that there is a constant exogenous real interest rate
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r, the current account in period t can be written as:
CAt = Wt+1 −Wt = XTt − CTt +XNt − CNt + rWt
= ηtHt − γ(Ht +Rt) + rWt
= γHt − (1− γ)Rt − γ(Ht +Rt) + rWt
= rWt −Rt. (9)
The second row follows from (3), the demand function for traded goods, and
the equilibrium condition (5). The third row follows from (7). Equation (9)
highlights the fact that the planner’s problem may be viewed as the task
of choosing the optimal current account over time. By repeated iterative
substitutions for Wt+1,Wt+2, .. in (9) (in the manner of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
(1996, ch. 2.1)), we arrive at the economy’s intertemporal budget constraint:
MX
t=1
µ
1
1 + r
¶t−1
Rt = (1 + r)W1. (10)
In (10), we have also imposed the terminal conditionWM+1 = 0; the planner
will use all the resources his or her budget constraint allows.
2.2 National wealth
As stated above, the planner’s problem is to maximize (6) subject to (8), (9)
and the terminal condition. This problem is more easily analyzed however by
merging (8) and (9) into one constraint, describing the dynamics of national
wealth. At the start of period t+1, the planner’s measure of national wealth
is:
NWt+1 = (1 + r)Wt+1 +
MX
s=t+1
µ
1
1 + r
¶s−(t+1)
Hs. (11)
It includes (financial/natural resource) wealth accumulated through period
t plus the present value of current and future income. Next, we observe that
repeated iterative substitutions in (8) implies that GDP in period s > t can
be written as:
Hs = (1 + αγ)s−tHt − α(1− γ)
s−1X
i=t
(1 + αγ)s−1−iRi.
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Using this and equation (9) in (11), we can express national wealth in period
t+ 1 as:
NWt+1 = (1 + r) [(1 + r)Wt −Rt] + (1 + r)
MX
s=t+1
µ
1 + αγ
1 + r
¶s−t
Ht
−α(1− γ)
MX
s=t+1
µ
1
1 + r
¶s−(t+1)
[(1 + αγ)s−(t+1)Rt
+
MX
i=t+1
(1 + αγ)s−1−iRi]. (12)
This single dynamic constraint now replaces the two constraints (8) and
(9) in the planner’s maximization problem. We notice that the period t
spending of the foreign exchange gift enters the constraint via two terms.
The first term represents the ordinary eﬀect of lower future financial/natural
resource wealth, while the second term represents the negative eﬀect on future
income through lower productivity growth. Given this formulation of the
budget constraint, we can also restate the terminal condition as NWM+1 = 0.
Later, we will also make use of a more familiar form of (national) wealth
dynamics. From (11), we have:
NWt+1 = (1 + r)[(1 + r)Wt −Rt] + (1 + r)
MX
s=t
µ
1
1 + r
¶s−t
Hs − (1 + r)Ht
= (1 + r)
"
(1 + r)Wt +
MX
s=t
µ
1
1 + r
¶s−t
Hs − Ct
#
= (1 + r) (NWt − Ct) . (13)
3 Optimal aggregate consumption
We shall first present the solution for optimal aggregate consumption. As will
become clear below, our model has interesting implications for the optimal
intertemporal consumption allocation compared to models either without
growth or with exogenous growth.7 The planner chooses {Rt} to maximize
7A non-growing economy can be studied within our framework when there is no LBD,
i.e. when α = 0. A model with exogenous growth can be analyzed by considering the
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(6) subject to (12) and the terminal condition. In solving this problem, we
make one assumption:
Assumption 1: r > αγ.
This is a suﬃcient condition for positive consumption in all periods (see
below). In eﬀect it states that the interest rate is higher than the economy’s
output growth in the absence of government intervention, and is standard in
open economy growth models.
Proposition 1 Let
J(NWt) = max
Rt
MX
t=1
µ
1
1 + δ
¶t−1
log(Rt +Ht),
subject to (12) and the terminal condition. Then:
J(NWt) = Φt +Θt logNWt,
where Θt = 1+δδ
h
1−
¡
1
1+δ
¢M−ti
and Φt is an inessential function of time
only. Optimal consumption is:
Ct = htNWt, (14)
where
ht ≡
1
1 +
h
1+δ
δ
³
1−
¡
1
1+δ
¢M−t+1´− 1i h1 + α(1−γ)
r−αγ
³
1−
¡
1+αγ
1+r
¢M−t´i (15)
Proof. See the appendix.
By applying equation (13) and (14) it is now straightforward to demon-
strate that aggregate consumption grows according to:
Ct+1
Ct
= (1 + r)
ht+1
ht
(1− ht) (16)
in optimum. Although the optimal consumption growth rate is generally
time-varying and non-linear, an important intuition can be provided:
borderline case of γ = 1. Our country would then produce and consume tradables only,
in eﬀect giving us a one-sector model with an exogenous output growth rate = α.
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Corollary 1 Compared to non-growing economies or economies with ex-
ogenous growth, learning by doing implies that it is optimal to consume a
lower fraction of national wealth in any period, except for the last period
t =M .
Proof. (A) That hM = 1 regardless of the size of α or γ follows directly
from (15).8 (B) In any period t < M , the last square bracket in the denom-
inator of (15) is (i) larger than 1 if α > 0 and γ < 1, and (ii) equal to 1 if
α = 0 or γ = 1. Hence ht|α=0 = ht|γ=1 > ht|α>0,γ<1, t < M .
The intuition behind Corollary 1 is that consumption is more costly in
our endogenous growth model. In our economy increased consumption in one
period not only lowers future financial wealth, it also lowers future produc-
tivity growth. In other words, saving an extra euro in our model gives interest
plus higher production in the future. Hence, it is optimal to save more than
in economies either without growth or with exogenous growth. Moreover,
the consumption-wealth ratio increases faster over time with LBD.
Further intuition on the result of the optimal consumption growth can
be provided by considering asymptotic properties of our model, i.e. when
M → ∞. When the planner has a very long time horizon, equation (15)
gives:
lim
M→∞
ht =
δ
1 + δ + α(1−γ)
r−αγ
, (17)
which is a constant. We note that when α = 0 (zero growth) or when
γ = 1 (exogenous growth), a constant share δ
1+δ of national wealth should be
consumed in each period. But with LBD, a lower constant share of national
wealth should be consumed in each period. Furthermore, from (17) and (16)
we have:
lim
M→∞
Ct+1 − Ct
Ct
=
r
³
1 + α(1−γ)
r−αγ
´
− δ
1 + δ + α(1−γ)
r−αγ
.
Thus with an infinite planning horizon, the optimal consumption growth rate
is a constant. The first term in the numerator on the right-hand side of this
expression can be interpreted as the eﬀective interest rate with an infinite
horizon in our model. It gives the marginal return from saving in the infinite
8It also follows from combining (15) with the terminal condition NWM+1 = 0.
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horizon case. The planner would tilt the optimal consumption path up or
down according to the diﬀerence between this adjusted interest rate and the
rate of time preference. For instance, with r = δ it would be optimal with
constant consumption in non-growing or exogenous growth economies. In
our model, however, this parameter combination implies a growing optimal
consumption path. Again, this is because the eﬀective interest rate is higher
than r in our setup, increasing optimal saving.9
4 Optimal transfers and output growth
The optimal path for aggregate consumption discussed above has implica-
tions for how the foreign exchange gift should be phased into the economy.
This section derives the optimal spending path, from which the paths for
output and the current account follow. As the optimal consumption growth
rate in general is time-varying and non-linear, the analytical solutions of the
model become quite complex for horizons of more than two to three peri-
ods. To highlight the intuition behind our model we therefore proceed in
two steps. First, we discuss the analytical solution in the two-period case in
some detail. Second, we show numerical paths to highlight the intuition in
the general case.
4.1 An example with M = 2
With M = 2, from (15) we have C2 = NW2 and C1 = 1+δ
2+δ+α(1−γ)
1+r
NW1. Then
(16) gives us:
C2
C1
=
1 + r
1 + δ
µ
1 +
α(1− γ)
1 + r
¶
. (18)
LBD implies higher optimal consumption growth than in models with zero
or exogenous growth. Since Ct = Ht +Rt, (18) can be expressed as:
R2 +H2 = (R1 +H1)
·
1 + r
1 + δ
µ
1 +
α(1− γ)
1 + r
¶¸
.
9With an infinite horizon our solution may be in conflict with ηt ∈ (0, 1), as in Mat-
suyama (1992). In that case one needs to maximize (6) subject to (12) and ηt ∈ (0, 1).
We do not pursue this matter further.
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Substituting for H2 from (8), we find that second period spending of the
foreign exchange gift is:
R2 =
·
1 + r
1 + δ
µ
1 +
α(1− γ)
1 + r
¶
+ α(1− γ)
¸
R1 (19)
+
·
1 + r
1 + δ
µ
1 +
α(1− γ)
1 + r
¶
− (1 + αγ)
¸
H1.
Let us pause here and temporarily assume that r = δ:
• Without LBD (α = 0) equation (19) would reduce to R2 = R1, which
from (10) implies that R1 =
(1+r)2
2+r
W1. This ensures that the two gen-
erations are given equal amounts of the foreign exchange gift.
• Within an exogenous growth framework (γ = 1), (19) gives R2 = R1−
αH1. Applying (10), we find R1 = (1+r)
2
2+r
W1 +
1
2+r
αH1. The planner
would now increase transfers to generation 1 with a share 1/(2 + r) of
the exogenous output growth from period 1 to 2.
• Using (19) in (10), our two-sector, LBD framework implies:
R1 =
(1 + r)2
2 + r + 2+r
1+r
α(1− γ)
W1 +
αγ − α(1−γ)
1+r
2 + r + 2+r
1+r
α(1− γ)
H1. (20)
The higher the foreign exchange gift W1, the higher the transfers to
generation 1 should be. However, with LBD it is optimal to transfer a
lower fraction of the foreign exchange gift than is otherwise the case.
In the absence of a foreign exchange gift, transfers to the first generation
are positive provided that γ− (1−γ)
1+r
> 0, and negative if the opposite is
the case. The intuition for this is that the two eﬀects pull in opposite
directions. On the one hand, with a positive growth potential (α > 0)
the planner would like to transfer resources away from generation 2
towards generation 1. On the other hand, transferring resources to
generation 1 is costly in terms of lower output growth. This cost is
higher the more a given amount of transfers push down traded sector
employment, and thus learning. The larger the share of non-traded
goods in consumption (1−γ), the more costly are transfers to generation
one in terms of future output. Thus for a suﬃciently high (1 − γ),
transfers to the first generation are negative.
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Whereas r = δ implies that the foreign exchange gift should be spread
out in equal amounts in a non-growing economy, the first generation should
receive more than the second with exogenous growth. With endogenous
growth, this eﬀect may very well be reversed. It is costly in terms of lower
future output to spend the gift today, and so the planner may in fact transfer
less to generation 1 compared to a non-growing economy.
Leaving the case of r = δ, we can use (19) in (10) to find the general
expression for optimal R1:
R1 =
(1 + r)2
1 + r + 1+r
1+δ +
2+δ
1+δα(1− γ)
W1 +
1 + αγ − α(1−γ)
1+r
− 1+r
1+δ
1 + r + 1+r
1+δ +
2+δ
1+δα(1− γ)
H1. (21)
Without the foreign exchange gift R1 is negative if the last numerator in
(21) is < 0. It then follows from (8) that the optimal output growth rate is
higher than the ’market solution’ implies. If the nominator is> 0, the optimal
growth rate is less than in the ’market solution’, as in the optimal solution
more resources should have been transferred to the present generation even
when this leads to lower growth.
Equation (21) also shows us that R1 is unambiguously increasing in W1.
Thus, the optimal output growth path decreases when the country receives a
foreign exchange gift. In contrast to the positive growth models of the Dutch
disease, such as Krugman (1987), Matsuyama (1992), Sachs and Warner
(1995), Gylfason et al. (1999) and Torvik (2001), which tend to view lower
growth as a problem resulting from foreign exchange gifts, we have shown
that this is in fact an optimal response.
The implications for the current account are straightforward: ceteris
paribus, LBD implies less consumption of the foreign exchange gift in pe-
riod 1, giving a smaller current account deficit (larger surplus). Using (21)
in (9), the current account in period 1 is:
CA1 =
r
¡
1+r
1+δ + α(1− γ)
2+δ
1+δ − 1
¢
− 1
1 + r + 1+r
1+δ + α(1− γ)
2+δ
1+δ
W1 +
α(1−γ)
1+r
+ 1+r
1+δ − (1 + αγ)
1 + r + 1+r
1+δ + α(1− γ)
2+δ
1+δ
H1,
which in general has an ambiguous sign.
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4.2 General case
To find the optimal spending of the foreign exchange gift when M > 2, we
start by rewriting (16) as:
Rt+1 +Ht+1 =
·
(1 + r)
ht+1
ht
(1− ht)
¸
(Rt +Ht),
which in combination with (8) implies:
Rt+1 =
·
(1 + r)
ht+1
ht
(1− ht) + α(1− γ)
¸
Rt
−
·
1 + αγ − (1 + r)ht+1
ht
(1− ht)
¸
Ht. (22)
Equations (8) and (22) comprise a system of diﬀerence equations that the
two endogenous variables R and H have to fulfill in the optimum.
For horizons longer than two to three periods, the analytical solutions
quickly become complex, and we illustrate the intuition with numerical sim-
ulations.
Parameters and initial state variable values
Each time period (generation) is 25 years and the planner has a planning
horizon of 250 years, i.e. M = 10. In our benchmark simulations we set r
and δ equal at 85.4 %. This corresponds to annual time preference rates and
interest rates of 2.5 %. The traded goods expenditures share is set to γ = 0.4.
We start out with a moderate LBD eﬀect, using α = 0.1 in our benchmark
simulation. We normalize the first period’s GDP, which is predetermined, to
H1 = 100. Finally, we assume that the country receives a substantial foreign
exchange gift W1 = 25, corresponding to about six years of initial period
production.
Benchmark results
Chart 1 displays the optimal path of production, foreign exchange gift
spending, foreign assets, and the current account, given the parameters and
initial state variable values above.10
**Chart 1 about here**
10To limit the number of paths, we leave out the path for aggregate consumption; it is
simply the sum of H and R in each period.
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Both output H and transfers R grow over time, but whereas output
growth decreases through time, the growth in R increases (although this
is barely visible in the chart, the eﬀect is there). As it is optimal to spend
relatively little of the foreign exchange gift in the first periods, the country
initially builds up its foreign assets further. Not until period 7 does the
planner start to run current account deficits CA. We notice that since R
grows faster than output, equation (7) implies that employment in the traded
sector optimally decreases over time.
To put these results into perspective, we display the corresponding paths
in a non-growing economy (α = 0) and an economy with exogenous growth
(γ = 1) in charts 2 and 3 respectively. Without growth, all generations
receive the same share of the foreign exchange gift, equal to the annuity
value of the gift. As a result, the nation runs a current account deficit in
each period, albeit at an increasing pace. (Up to and including period 6, the
deficit is smaller than 1 % of GDP.) As there is a constant ratio between R
and H, employment in the two sectors in this case is constant.
**Chart 2 about here**
Interestingly, chart 3 shows the opposite patterns forW , R, and CA com-
pared to those in chart 1. With exogenous growth, the spending path for
the foreign exchange gift should decrease over time. Foreign assets should
decline at a rapid pace initially, and the current account should be negative
until period 8 and then positive. We notice that this ensures equal consump-
tion for each generation, whereas the endogenous growth framework in chart
1 implies increasing consumption over time. Again, this is because the opti-
mal real interest rate for consumption decisions is in eﬀect larger within our
LBD framework.
**Chart 3 about here**
Sensitivity analysis
Chart 4 displays the paths for output H (in the upper graphs) and trans-
fers R (in the lower graphs) for diﬀerent values of α. The higher is α, the
more concave is the output path, and the more convex is the spending path
of the foreign exchange gift. For higher values of α, the optimal R should
start at a lower level and then increase faster the closer we are to the time
horizon. The resulting output growth is one of fast initial growth that slows
as we approach period M .
** Chart 4 about here **
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Turning to the eﬀect of the traded goods expenditure share γ, we have
already seen from charts 1 and 3 above that diﬀerent values can have impor-
tant eﬀects on the solution. While γ = 0.4 implies an increasing spending
path, γ = 1 gives a negatively sloped optimal spending path. The opposite
slopes of the spending paths reflect a fundamental trade-oﬀ that the planner
faces in our model: on the one hand output growth generally implies that the
early generations should receive a larger share of the foreign exchange gift
(as in an exogenous growth model), but on the other hand, spending should
be postponed because of its adverse eﬀect on future productivity. The eﬀect
that pulls in the direction of large transfers to early generations is stronger
the higher is γ, as a large expenditure share on traded goods implies a large
traded sector and thus a high growth potential for any given level of total
demand. The eﬀect that pulls in the direction of postponing spending, on
the other hand, is weaker the larger is γ. This is because a large expenditure
share on traded goods and a small expenditure share on non-traded goods
ensures that little of an extra euro in demand is directed towards the non-
traded sector. That is, higher demand does not greatly reduce traded sector
employment (and thus productivity growth). Therefore, there is little gain
in future productivity from postponing spending.
Thus, there is some value of γ where the two eﬀects cancel, giving a con-
stant optimal spending path. Holding other parameters fixed, γ ≈ 0.466
gives a constant spending path in our example. Chart 5 illustrates the eﬀect
on optimal output and spending for three diﬀerent values of γ. The higher
is γ, the faster is optimal output growth (shown in the upper graphs) and
the larger is the share of the foreign exchange gift that should be allocated
to the first generations (shown in the lower graphs). We notice that although
the optimal path for R falls for a suﬃciently high γ, optimal aggregate con-
sumption would increase over time in our model for all γ < 1.
** Chart 5 about here **
The eﬀect on the spending path from a higher interest rate is analogous
in our model to that in non-growing or exogenous growth economies. In
all cases optimal saving increases and so the R path becomes steeper. How-
ever, in our endogenous growth framework, this would also imply that output
growth increases initially and then becomes lower as M approaches. Like-
wise, an increase in the rate of time preference lowers optimal saving in all
models considered, implying that it would be optimal to distribute more of
the foreign exchange gift to the first generations. As a consequence optimal
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output growth would decrease initially and increase in later periods in the
LBD model.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have extended the growth literature on the Dutch disease
from a positive to a normative setting. Adopting the same assumptions
that were used in the earlier growth literature on the Dutch disease, we
have derived the implications for optimal saving of resource wealth and the
corresponding optimal growth of consumption and output. LBD implies that
the optimal share of national wealth consumed in each period needs to be
adjusted downwards. However, some Dutch disease is always optimal in the
sense that a positive fraction of the resource wealth should be consumed in
each period. We have seen that the optimal consumption decision diﬀers from
models of both zero and exogenous growth. The spending path of the resource
wealth may be increasing or decreasing over time. The more important non-
traded goods are as a proportion of consumption, and the less important
traded goods are, the more likely it is that the optimal spending path of the
resource wealth is increasing over time.
The growth literature on the Dutch disease has provided important contri-
butions towards understanding why resource abundance may reduce growth.
In addition the literature has raised new questions that need to be analyzed in
a normative setting. If the use of resource wealth hurts productivity growth,
an important question is how such wealth should then be managed. We hope
the present paper has provided some initial answers to this question.
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A Proof of proposition 1
For the proposed value function Jt, the Bellman optimality equation is:
Φt +Θt logNWt
= max
Rt
·
log(Rt +Ht) +
1
1 + δ (Φt+1 +Θt+1 logNWt+1)
¸
, (A.1)
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subject to (12). The first-order condition can be written as:
C−1t =
Θt+1
1 + δ
"
1 + r + α(1− γ)
MX
s=t+1
µ
1 + αγ
1 + r
¶s−t+1#
NW−1t+1
=
1 + r
1 + δΘt+1
"
1 +
α(1− γ)
r − αγ
Ã
1−
µ
1 + αγ
1 + r
¶M−t!#
NW−1t+1.
Inverting this expression, substituting for NWt+1 from (13), and simplifying
gives:
Ct =
(1 + r)(1 + δ)
(1 + r)(1 + δ) + (1 + r)Θt+1
h
1 + α(1−γ)
r−αγ
³
1−
¡
1+αγ
1+r
¢M−t´iNWt
≡ htNWt. (A.2)
Substituting for C in (A.1) gives:
Φt +Θt logNWt = log (htNWt)
+
1
1 + δ {Θt+1 log [(1 + r)(1− ht)NWt] + Φt+1}
=
µ
1 +
1
1 + δΘt+1
¶
logNWt
+ log ht +
Φt+1
1 + δ +
Θt+1
1 + δ log ((1 + r)(1− ht)) .
Thus, the proposed value function is established for:
Θt = 1 + (1 + δ)−1Θt+1, (A.3)
and:
Φt = log ht +
Φt+1
1 + δ +
Θt+1
1 + δ log ((1 + r)(1− ht)) .
(A.3) can be evaluated recursively by observing that ΘM = 1. Hence,
ΘM−1 = 1 +
1
1+δ , ΘM−2 = 1 +
1
1+δ +
¡
1
1+δ
¢2
, etc. In general,
Θt = 1 +
1
1 + δ +
µ
1
1 + δ
¶2
+ · · ·+
µ
1
1 + δ
¶M−t
=
1 + δ
δ
Ã
1−
µ
1
1 + δ
¶M−t+1!
. (A.4)
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Applying in (A.2) gives:
ht =
(1 + r)(1 + δ)
(1 + r)(1 + δ) + (1 + r)(1 + δ) (Θt − 1)
h
1 + α(1−γ)
r−αγ
³
1−
¡
1+αγ
1+r
¢M−t´i .
Inserting from (A.4) gives us equation (15), and completes the proof.¥
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Chart 1: Optimal paths for output, spending of the foreign exchange gift, the current account, and beginning-of-
period foreign assets.
Note: Based on following parameter- and initial state variable values: r = = 85.4 %,  = 0.1,  = 0.4, H1= 100, W1 = 25.
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Chart 2: Optimal paths for output, spending of the foreign exchange gift, the current account, and beginning-of-
period foreign assets in a non-growing economy.
Note: Based on following parameter- and initial state variable values: r = = 85.4 %,  = 0,  = 0.4, H1= 100, W1 = 25.
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Chart 3: Optimal paths for output, spending of the foreign exchange gift, the current account, and beginning-of-
period foreign assets in an economy with exogenous growth.
Note: Based on following parameter- and initial state variable values: r = = 85.4 %,  = 0.1,  = 1, H1 = 100, W1 = 25.
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Chart 4: Optimal paths for output (upper 4 graphs) and spending of the foreign exchange gift (lower 4 graphs) for
different values of .
Note: Except for , all parameters and initial state variables have the same values as in Chart 1.
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Chart 5: Optimal paths for output (upper 3 graphs) and spending of the foreign exchange gift (lower 3 graphs) for
different values of .
Note: Except for , all parameters and initial state variables have the same values as in Chart 1.
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